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COMPETITION FOR HUB DOMINANCE: SOME IMPLICATIONS TO
AIRLINE PROFITABILITY AND ENPLANEMENT SHARE
Atef Ghobrial
ABSTRACT
The phenomenon ofairline competition for hub dominance in terms of frequency concentration
has been on the rise since deregulation. Using cross-sectional time-series data, this study
explores the impact of hub dominance on airline profitability and enplanement share at the hub
airport. The regression analysis finds a significant positive relationship between airline profitability
and hub dominance. The relationship between an airline's share ofpassenger enplanements and
its hub dominance seems to follow an S-curve indicating that high frequency shares are
associated with even higher enplanement shares, and conversely.
INTRODUCTION
Deregulation has led to
radical changes in airline
network planning. A main focal
point for these changes has
been the greatly increased
emphasis on Ihubbing.I All
carriers have sought to build up
their previous hubs, and in many
cases have created new ones.
The hubbing phenomenon
has been the subject of many
studies. Kanafani and Ghobrial
(1982) studied the relationship
between the economies of
aircraft size and airline hubbing.
In 1985, they expanded their
analysis to assess the impact of
airline hubbing on airport
congestion and its implications
to airport economics. Kanafani
and Hansen (1985) showed that,
when all other variables (such as
stage length, aircraft capacity,
network size, etc.) are controlled
airlines with strong hubbed route
systems incur roughly the same
cost to provide a given amount
of transportation as those with
less hubbed systems. Ghobrial
and Sousa (1987) investigated
some airline strategies to
dominate their main connecting
hubs.
Toh and Higgins (1985)
attempted to test whether there
20
exists a positive and strong
relationship between airline
hubbing and profitability. They
developed two indices for airline
hubbing and profitability for 17
airlines in 1982. The regression
of the hub index on the profit-
ability index showed a very poor
fit and the independent variable
(hub index) seemed to be statis-
tically insignificant. Toh and
Higgins (1985) also commented
that profitability is not
guaranteed by hub netwrok
centrality, which is contrary to
popular belief.
This paper is an attempt to
extend the work of Toh and
Higgins to explore further the
impact of hub dominance on
airline profitability and its
passenger enplanement share.
The findings of Toh and Higgins
together with the results of this
study will help shed some light
on the commonly held belief that
hubbing leads to more
successful and profitable
operations (see Aviation Week
and Space Technology,
November 1981). The paper
begins by discussing the
phenomenon of airline hubbing
and hub dominance. This is
followed by exploring the
relationship between profitability
and hub dominance using
regression analysis. The second
phase of this paper assesses the
impact of hub dominance on
airline share of passenger
enplanements at the hub air-
port. The paper concludes with
some implications to airline
network planning, congestion at
major hubs, and the public
policy towards airline mergers.
TRENDS IN AIRLINE
NETWORK CENTRALITY
AND HUB DOMINANCE
A comparison of airline
networks of today with those of
the mid 1970s amply
demonstrates that hubbing has
increased. The now familiar
pattern of multiple links
emanating from a handful of hub
airports has replaced the
seeming hodge-podge that
characterized many route
systems under regulation.
One indication of a hubbed
network is the concentration of
operations at a few airports
which serve as transfer points for
connecting traffic. Measures of
concentration of an airline's
operations can therefore serve
as measures of the degree of
hubbing of that airline's route
network. One such a measure is
the one-airport concentration
JAAER, Fall 1991
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Table 1
Operational Statistics for Selected Airlines In 1980
Airline Main Hubbing hub airline profit
hub index * dominance ranking at index **
index * main hub %
AA ORO 0.146 26.80 2 -3.50
AL PIT 0.189 63.04 1 9.47
BN DFW 0.321 37.82 1 -5.70
CO DEN 0.252 26.30 3 -5.28
DL ATL 0.224 46.40 1 5.42
EA ATL 0.208 41.19 2 0.47
FL DEN 0.225 34.14 1 7.49
NW MSP 0.156 41.09 1 2.12
OZ STL 0.205 32.36 2 -0.34
PA MIA 0.141 21.99 2 -8.97
PI ROA 0.081 99.50 1 6.62
RC ORO 0.066 15.39 3 1.53
TW STL 0.140 41.94 1 -1.85
UA ORO 0.164 43.61 1 -1.55
WA LAX 0.170 25.07 2 -3.62
* Estimated using data from IAirport Activity Statistics of Certificated Route Air Carrier-, U.S. Department of
Transportation, The Federal Aviation Administration, 1980.
** Estimated using data from lAir Carriers Financial Statisticsl , Civil Aeronautics Board and the U.S. Department
of Transportation, 11980
ratio which is defined as the ratio
of the airline's departures from
its main hub to the total aircraft
departures from all airports
within the airline's domestic
system. This ratio will be referred
to as the hubbing index. For a
complete hub-and-spoke
network structure (i.e.; all spoke
cities are connected only to the
hub airport) the number of
aircraft operations (i.e.; take-offs
and landings) at the hub airport
is equal to the number of aircraft
operations at all other airports.
The hubbing index is, therefore,
equal to 0.5 for a complete
hub-and-spoke network
structure. The trend of the
hubbing index for some selected
airlines' distributions of
scheduled departures for the
JAAER, Fall 1991
years 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982,
1984 and 1986 was estimated.
For the purpose of illustration,
Table 1 depicts this trend for the
selected airlines in 1980. Overall,
the time-series data suggest an
upward trend in the hubbing
index. The few instances of
downward movement are likely
due to large scale network
expansions, which naturally tend
to reduce concentration.
A parallel phenomenon to
airline hubbing is hub
dominance. While hubbing
measures network centrality
within the airline's system, hub
dominance measures airline
concentration relative to other
airlines operating at the same
hub. An airline's dominance
index at a particular hub could
be estimated as the share of that
airline's departures of the total
aircraft departures by all airlines
from that hub. This index can
also serve as a proxy for hub
monopoly. The hub dominance
index was calculated for all air-
lines under investigation at their
main connecting hub over the
period 1976-1984. Only domestic
operations were considered for
airlines offering both domestic
and international services such
as Pan Am, TWA, Northwest, etc.
Table 1 reports the hub
dominance index (in percent-
ages) for the airlines under in
1980. Also depicted in Table 1 is
the airline's ranking at its main
connecting hub in terms of the
number of aircraft departures.
An analysis of the time-series
21
2
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 2, No. 1 [1991], Art. 5
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol2/iss1/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.1991.1053
Hub Dominance
data of airline ranking at major
hubs over 1976-1984 indicates
that airlines have exploited the
opportunities of free entry and
exit of deregulation and
attempted to dominate the hubs
which they use as funnel and
transfer points for their
passengers.
Hub dominance appears to be
highly instrumental in
establishing a strong regional
identification among passengers
which is important for marketing
the airline. Examples are Delta at
Atlanta, American at Dallas/Fort
Worth, TWA at St. Louis, and
Continental at Houston. In
addition, a dominant airline at a
particular hub can reap the
monopoly profits in the markets
Equation 1
served by that hub. Since the
monopolist can alter the supply
of flights and set the price (i.e.;
airfare), monopoly profits in this
case are usually larger than
those attained· under highly
competitive conditions.
HUB DOMINANCE AND
AIRLINE PROFITABILITY
The analysis of airline
profitability is a complex one that
involves a. number of factors
including network structure, hub
dominance, fleet type and
average aircraft size, stage
length, average yield, route
monopoly, load factor, degree of
unionization, and management
skills. For the purpose of this
study, we will attempt to test the
hypothesis that there exists a
positive and strong relationship
between airline profitability and
hub dominance. The profitability
index is estimated by dividing
operating income (i.e., operating
revenue-operating expense) by
the operating revenue and
multiplying it by 100 to be
expressed in percentage terms.
A profitability index is calculated
for all the airlines under consid-
eration. Table 1 shows the
estimated profitability index for
these airlines in 1980.
The Model
The relationship between airline
profitability and hub dominance
is expressed as a linear
regression model which takes
the following form:
PROFF u+PDOMr+tFIRMI+8(Y7~+
~(Y8~+4>(Y8~+3(Y84) +
a(Y86)+e (1)
Where PROFi is the profitability
index in percentage terms of
airline i, DOMi is its hub
dominance index in percentage
points at the main hub, and
FIRMi is a firm-specific variable
which takes on the value one for
airline i and zero otherwise with
Pan Am (PA) as the control
carrier. Y78, Yao, Y82, Y84 and
Y86 in Equation 1 are dummy
variables for the year with 1976
as the control year (e.g.; Y80
takes on the value one for
observations in 1980 and zero
otherwise.) CI, 8, ~, 9, II, ., ~,
and a are the coefficients to be
estimated and e is the error
term. Note that the inclusion of a
firm-specific variable FIRM in the
22
model is intended to capture the
effects of other variables
influencing the carrier's profit-
ability. This is useful when
analyzing cross sectional data.
The model in Equation 1 was
estimated twice (i.e.; with and
without the firm-specific variable
FIRM) using the cross sectional,
time series data over 1976-84.
The results of estimating both
models along with t-statistics are
shown in Table 2. For the
purpose of simplicity and
comparison, the variable FIRM is
replaced by its corresponding
airline code in Table 2. Note that
the Durbin-Watson value in
Table 2 indicates that the hypo-
thesis that there exists no first
order serial correlation cannot be
rejected. No correction was,
therefore, preformed on the
results obtained.
Analysis
The coefficient B in both model
estimations is positive and
statistically significant at the 0.05
level. The hypothesis that there
exists a positive and strong
association between profitability
and hub dominance cannot,
therefore, be rejected. The value
of coefficient B in the second
model estimation indicates that a
one percent increase in an
airline's hub dominance index
will likely be associated with an
increase of 0.178 percentage
points in its profitability index.
JAAER, Fall 1991
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The results suggest that a
dominant airline at a particular
hub reaps the monopoly profits
by charging higher fares.
The inclusion of the firm-
specific variable increased the
regression fit as the value of the
multiple correlation coefficient
(R2) improved from 0.326 to
0.543. The yearly dummy
variables suggest increasing
losses between 1980 and 1982,
with 1984 marking a period of
financial recovery for the
Hub Dominance
industry. This pattern seems to
accord with the trends in fuel
prices as well as the intense
competition among airlines in the
first few years of deregulation
which may have led to destruct-
ive airfare competition.
Table 2:
Results of Model Estimating Equation 1
MODEL 1 MODEL 2
VARIABLEI Estimated T- Estimated T-
COEFFICIENT Value Statistics Value Statistics
CONSTANT -1.535 -0.60 -11.239 -3.23
DOM 0.205 4.74 0.178 2.58
Y78 -3.041 -1.04 -2.865 -1.06
Y80 -6.529 -2.28 -7.631 -2.79
Y82 -10.964 -3.86 -11.324 -2.70
Y84 -6.953 -2.36 -6.899 -2.39
Y86 -6.713 -2.22 -8.247 -2.86
AA 12.658 3.02
AL 11.882 2.34
BN 10.468 2.03
CO 14.351 3.43
DL 14.422 3.35
EA 12.435 2.85
FL 10.662 2.66
NW 12.888 2.91
OZ 13.662 3.04
PI 9.361 1.61
RC 18.112 3.99
TW 7.089 1.65
UA 10.593 2.76
WA 10.123 2.33
R-8quared = 0.33 R-8quared = 0.54
Durbin-Watson = 2.18 Durbin-Watson = 2.41
The above results coupled with
those obtained by Toh and
Higgins suggest that increased
emphasis on hUbbing cannot, by
itself, contribute to airline profit-
ability unless it is associated with
airline dominance of the main
hub (or the few hUbs) it uses for
its operations. To elaborate
JAAER, Fa//1991
further, we provide two
examples. The first is the case of
USAir which, in 1980, established
a hub in Pittsburgh where
competition was generally
absent. While most airlines
experienced losses in 1980 and
1982, USAir posted impressive
profits, and, overall, USAir was
the most profitable airline
between 1980 and 1984. The
second example is Pride Air
which, in late 1985, adopted a
complete hub-and-spoke system
with New Orleans as the main
hub (i.e., hubbing index equals
0.5). Pride Air could not with-
stand competition at New
23 4
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Orleans from other dominant
airlines (such as Delta, Eastern,
Continental, Southwest, etc.) and
had to declare bankruptcy by the
end of 1986.
In light of the above, one can
conclude that the commonly
held belief that hubbing leads to
more successful operations is
attributed mainly to the fact that
most airlines tend to dominate
the main connecting hubs within
their systems. This is apparent
by examining individual airline's
ranking at the major hub as
shown in Table 1.
HUB DOMINANCE AND
AIRLINE ENPLANEMENT
SHARE
The second phase of this study
is to assess the impact of hub
dominance on airline
enplanement share at the hub
airport. Route monopoly and
market dominance have been
the subject of many studies
which attempted to relate an
airline's passenger share in a
given market to its frequency
share of the total flights in the
market. Renald (1970), Fruhan
(1972), and Miller (1979) showed
that the relationship between an
airline's market share and its
frequency share follows an
S-curve; meaning that high
Equation 3
frequency shares are associated
with even higher market shares
and conversely. Following the
same approach, we will test the
hypothesis that there exists a
positive and strong relationship
between an airline's enplane-
ment share at a given airport
and its hub dominance. An
airline's enplanement share at a
hub is estimated as the ratio
between the airline's passenger
enplanements to the total
passenger enplanements by all
airlines at that hub.
The Model
In developing an enplanement
share model for an airline at a
given hub, it will be assumed
that passengers exhibit utility
maximization behavior in their
choice of a carrier. It can be
readily shown that by maximizing
the passenger's utility function,
the standard multinomial logit
probabilistic choice model can
be obtained, such that:
Equation 2
elJ(im)
p1m .E eIJ{Jn1J (2)
J
where Pim is the probability that
a passenger at hub m will select
an airline i, or simply the
passenger enplanements share
of airline i at hub m; and U{im) is
the utility of airline i to
passengers at hub m. The logit
model has widely been used in
similar applications, primarily
because of its advantages
relative to other probabilistic
choice model forms. For a
discussion and derivation of the
logit model, the reader can refer
to Kanafani (1985, Chi 5).
The passenger utility's function
consists of a vector (i.e.; array)
of the carrier's service attributes
at a particular hub. These
attributes include flight
frequency, aircraft size, airfare,
departure schedule, and airline
image. For the purpose of this
study, the utility function will
consist of the carrier's flight
frequency at the hub. Other
variables influencing an airline's
share of passenger enplane-
ments will be accounted for by
incorporating a firm-specific
variable in the utility function.
Based upon the above
discussion, the utility function
UOm) is given as:
U(jm) =a. LOG(FREQ) jm+P flRMr- e (3)
where FRE.Qjm is the flight
frequency of airline j at hub m,
FIRMj is a firm-specific variable
which takes on the value one for
carrier j and zero otherwise. CI
and B are the coefficients to be
estimated, and c is the error
24
term. A PRIORI sign of CI is
expected to be positive since an
increase in flight frequency will
yield better levels of service.
Levels of service include such
measures as frequency of flights,
aircraft size, on-time
performance, in-cabin service,
and flight itinerary (e.g.; non-stop
flights versus multi-stop or
connecting flights). Note that the
flight frequency variable (FREQ)
is expressed in a logarithmic
form in order to examine, in
JAAER, Fall 1991
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Table 3
Input Data for the Enplanement Share Model for 1980
Hub Dominance
Hub Airline Enplanements Aircraft
(millions) Departures
ORO AA 3745.3 47344
DL 1975.2 25286
UA 6217.5 77356
PIT AL 3022.6 54291
TW 978.2 15068
UA 619.5 9651
DFW BN 3645.7 57352
AA 3079.5 45658
DL 1677.5 23257
ATL DL 10342.7 119472
EA 7620.1 105170
RC 789.1 21620
DEN FL 2230.6 41880
CO 2107.1 31711
UA 2670.3 39002
MSP NW 1787.1 25618
RC 1023.3 24060
WA 532.2 8481
MIA PA 1078.4 14030
EA 2289.9 27881
DL 819.7 12116
STL TW 2333.1 34127
OZ 1042.4 24705
AA 661.9 14637
LAX WA 1953.7 23380
AA 1673.3 17337
UA 3033.6 34989
Source: IAirport Activity Statistics of Certificated Route Air Carriers.1
U.S. Department of Transportation. The Federal Aviation Administration. 1980
relative terms, the relationship frequency share as explained a multiple airport region, Harvey
between an airline's enplane- earlier. In his investigation of (1986) showed that using a
ments share and its flight passenger choice of an airport in nonlinear specification for
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yielded a better estimate than a
linear one.
In order to test the
hypothesisthat there exists a
positive and strong relationship
between airline enplanement
share and its hub dominance,
the logit model in Equation 2 is
estimated. In their survey of
airline strategies to dominate
their main hubs, Ghobrial and
Sousa (1987)showed that most
passenger enplanements at a
given hub are carried by the top
Table 4:
ResuRs of
Estimating Equation 3
three airlines. The logit model
was, therefore, estimated using
data for the top three airlines a
given hub. The hubs selected for
estimating the model are those
listed in Table 1 over the period
from 1976 to 1984. For the
purpose of illustration, Table 3
shows the 1980 data for aircraft
departures and passenger
enplanements for the top three
airlines dominating particular
hubs.
Using the cross sectional,
MODEL 1
time-series data for the selected
airlines over 1976-84, passenger
enplanements for each airline at
a given hub were converted to
proportions and the logit model
in Equation 2 was estimated
twice (i.e.; with and without the
firm-specific variable FIRM).
Because of the logarithmic
specification of the model, two
observations were omitted from
the data, that is, Piedmont's
operations at ROA in 1976 and
1978. The results of estimating
MODEL 2
VARIABLE!
COEFFICIENT
FREQ
AA
AL
BN
CO
DL
EA
FL
NW
OZ
PA
PI
RC
TW
UA
WA
LOG LIKELIHOOD
At Zero Slope:
At Convergance:
R-Squared:
Estimated
Value
1.0505
T-
Statistics
57.79
-263.62
-44.74
0.94
Estimated
Value
1.0790
0.0928
-0.3360
0.0022
0.0799
0.0453
-0.1899
-0.1928
0.0482
-0.1812
0.2029
-0.20~
0.5561
0.1459
0.1010
0.1313
T-
Statistics
63.45
1.27
-3.33
-0.03
0.82
0.60
-2.88
-1.86
0.53
-1.88
2.06
-2.22
-6.87
1.73
1.41
0.17
-262.62
13.59
0.97
both models along with t-statis-
tics are shown in Table 4. For
the purpose of comparison, the
26
variable FIRM is replaced by its
corresponding airline code in
Table 4.
Analysis
The sign of CI agrees with its A
PRIORI sign and the FREQ
JAAER, Fall 1991
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variable seems to be highly
significant. Moreover, using the
statistical hypothesis testing, one
cannot reject the hypothesis that
the coefficient u is greater than
one in both model specifications.
The relationship between
enplanement share and hub
dominance seems, therefore, to
follow an S-curve meaning that
high frequency shares at a given
airport are associated with even
higher enplanement shares, and
conversely.
For the purpose of illustration,
we consider the case of Delta
Airlines' operations at Atlanta
Hartsfield Airport between 1976
and 1986. Figure 1 depicts the
trends in Delta's share of the
total aircraft departures at Atlanta
(i.e., hub dominance index)
along with its share of pass·enger
enplanements (in percentage
points). The observed pattern
Delta's dominance of Atlanta
through frequency concentration
is evident. Because Delta is the
dominant airline at Atlanta its
share of passenger enplane-
ments is consistently higher than
its corresponding aircraft
departure share as depicted in
Figure 1.
The disproportionality
phenomenon between an
airline's enplanement shar.e and
its frequency share is attributed
to passenger identification with
the dominant carrier in the
region. For instance, local
travelers originating in the
Hub Dominance
Atlanta area learn which carrier
offers the greatest flight
frequency (Delta in this case)
and given the existence of
information costs, passengers
tend to contact that carrier first.
Information costs include the
time and communication
expenses of calling several
airlines and/or travel agencies.
Passengers flying Delta via
Atlanta can enhance their
chances of enjoying single-plane
service. Furthermore, through
increased frequency concen-
tration at Atlanta and a proper
timing of flight arrivals and
departures, Delta Airlines can
offer connecting passengers a
single-airline service (i.e., on-line
connection,) thus reducing the
• Delta's Aircraft
Departure Share
• Delta's Enplanement
Share
60
50
40
t
c 30B
is
a.
20
10
0
1976 1978 1980
Year
1982 1984 1986
Figure 1: Aircraft Departure Share and Enplanement Share for Delta Airlines at Atlanta Hartsfield Airport
passengers chances of missing
a connection or losing baggage.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper attempts to shed
light on the phenomenon of air-
JAAER, Fall 1991
line frequency competition as a
means to dominate its major
connecting hubs. It is concluded
that airline network centralization
(hubbing) cannot by itself contri-
bute to airline profitability unless
it is associated with airline
dominance of the main hub (or
the few hubs) it uses for its
operations. By dominating its
27
8
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 2, No. 1 [1991], Art. 5
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol2/iss1/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.1991.1053
Hub Dominance
main hubs, airlines can reap the
monopoly profits from the
markets served by these hubs
and realize higher enplanement
shares than departure shares.
Several conclusions emerge
from the above discussion. First,
in establishing a hub, airlines
seem to follow a number of
strategies including: 1) staying
away from competition by
monopolizing the hub such as
USAir operations at Pittsburgh,
and Piedmont at Charlotte; and
2) engaging in frequency
competition to dominate the hub,
and establishing regional identi-
fication with passengers to
promote airline services.
Examples are Delta at Atlanta,
American at Dallas/Fort Worth,
and TWA at St. Louis. Second, to
take advantage of the nonlinear
relationship between passenger
enplanements share and
frequency share, airlines may
elect to operate higher flight
frequency with relatively smaller
size planes. Agarwal and Tally
(1985) showed that passengers
are more sensitive to changes in
frequency delay (i.e., changes in
flight frequency) than to changes
in stochastic delay (i.e., changes
in aircraft size). Pacific South-
west Airlines appeared to have
adopted this strategy by
replacing many of its B-727 with
the smaller Bae 146-100 and Bae
146-200 aircraft in many routes
in the California corridor. Third,
since there has been a trend in
mergers between two airlines
dominating the same hub.
Examples are Northwest and
Republic at Minneapolis, TWA
and Ozark at St. Louis, and
Southwest and Transtar at
Houston. One can view these
mergers as a means to create a
monopoly power and charge
higher airfares. From the
perspective of policy making, the
issue of monopoly power ought
to be considered when
approving mergers between
airlines hubbing at the same
airport.
Finally, while hub dominance
through frequency competition
offers opportunities both for
airlines and passengers, it may
pose problems as well.
Excessive frequency concentra-
tion at airports may result in
some negative economic
impacts such as congestion,
pollution, and noise. Congestion
delay may outweigh some of the
benefits of aircraft concentration
by increasing flying costs for
airlines and travel time for
passengers.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
In attempting to assess the
impact of hub dominance on
airline profitability and
enplanement share, it was
assumed that flight frequency is
the only explanatory variable in
the econometric models. Other
variables contributing to airline
profitability and enplanement
share were accounted for by
incorporating a firm-specific
variable in the models. While the
results showed a positive strong
relationship between profitability
and enplanement share on one
hand and hub dominance on the
other, further research is needed
to incorporate other hub
dominance strategies in the
models. These include airfare
structure at the main hubs,
aircraft size, arrangements for
traffic feeding through a subsid-
iary, and frequency concentra-
tion during peak periods.
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